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 Operation Lal Dora:  India’s aborted military intervention in Mauritius 
 
Mauritius forms an anchor to India’s strategic role in the Indian Ocean.  India has long had a 
special economic, political and security relationship with Mauritius, which a US diplomatic 
report has characterised as Mauritius’ “willing subordination” to India.1 A key turning point 
in the relationship occurred in 1983, when, in Operation Lal Dora, India came to the point of 
a full scale military intervention in the island state to ensure that it stayed in India’s strategic 
orbit.    
 
This article will discuss a 1983 political crisis in Mauritius which threatened to overturn a 
Hindu-led government and led to plans for an Indian intervention in the island.  When 
Indian military leaders hesitated over a military operation, Indira Gandhi instead relied on 
her security services to achieve India’s objectives.  An understanding of this previously 
undisclosed operation casts light on India’s thinking about its role in the region, its military 
decision-making processes, and on what could be seen as a long-standing alignment of 
interests between India and the United States in the Indian Ocean. These issues are 
particularly relevant as the United States now looks to further develop its strategic 
partnership with India as part of its ‘Pivot to Asia’. 
 
Strategic rivalry in the Indian Ocean during the Cold War 
 
The southwest Indian Ocean of the late 1970s and early 1980s was a scene of superpower 
competition, rivalry and intrigue.   The Indian Ocean had become a new frontier of the Cold 
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War as the Soviet Union and the United States expanded their naval capabilities in the 
region and jostled for influence over the small and politically weak Indian Ocean island 
states.  The great distances across the Indian Ocean meant that access to local port facilities 
and air bases became a major focus of competition between the two superpowers.   At the 
same time, apartheid South Africa actively destabilised states that it considered hostile.  
This strategic competition led to considerable instability in the region.   Several of Indian 
Ocean island states including Seychelles, Comoros and Madagascar suffered coups involving 
foreign powers or mercenaries.   As the Mauritius Times commented in 1978,”Mauritius is 
the only important island left in the Indian Ocean that is not in the pocket of any 
superpower…It would be sheer folly to dismiss the likelihood of a coup in Mauritius.”2   
 
For much of the Cold War, the growing influence of the United States and the Soviet Union  
was the cause of considerable dismay for New Delhi.  India saw itself as destined to become 
the leading power in the Indian Ocean, but it did not have the military capability to 
challenge the regional presence of either the United States or a “friendly” Soviet Union.  The 
ideology of nonalignment to which India officially subscribed held that the ‘intrusion’ of 
great powers (particularly Western powers) into any part of the developing world was 
inherently illegitimate and the primary (if not only) source of insecurity among developing 
states.  From the early 1970s, India had strongly opposed the US military presence in the 
Indian Ocean as a threat to regional stability.  The “intrusion” of a US naval task force led by 
the USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal in the closing days of the 1971 Bangladesh war 
was long remembered in India as an outrageous and impermissible exercise in gunboat 
diplomacy.  New Delhi also strongly resented the US base on Diego Garcia which gave the 
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United States the capability to dominate the entire Indian Ocean and to potentially 
intervene in South Asia.      
 
Although India had a strategic partnership with the Soviet Union, it was also concerned 
about Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean region, particularly after the Soviet intervention 
in Afghanistan in 1980.   While New Delhi refrained from publicly condemning the Soviet 
presence in Afghanistan and continued in its anti-US rhetoric, there were increasingly 
instances where New Delhi and Washington had similar interests in the region.   From the 
early 1980s, the Reagan administration also increasingly saw India as a status quo power 
that could act as a security provider to the region.3 
  
Political instability in Mauritius 
 
Mauritius, the island state located some 900 km east of Madagascar, is in many ways the 
“Little India” of the Indian Ocean.  It was colonized by the Dutch, the French and then the 
British.   With no indigenous population, the Europeans imported slaves from Africa and 
indentured labour from India to work the sugar cane plantations.  Between 1834 and 1920, 
some 420,000 Indian workers migrated to Mauritius, many of them Bhojpuri speakers from 
the Indian state of Bihar. Today some 70% of Mauritius’ population is of Indian descent with 
the remainder is mostly French Creole speakers of African descent and a very small white 
French community.   Although the whites no longer hold the reins political power, the key 
Franco-Mauritian families or “Grand Blancs” as they are called, still exert considerable 
economic influence.  
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 Since gaining independence from Britain in 1968, Mauritius has managed to maintain a 
democratic system, but the road has sometimes been rocky.   Its early years were 
dominated by Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, leader of the Mauritian Labour Party, who 
shepherded Mauritius through independence and then governed for the next 14 years.  
Ramgoolam was pragmatic and a moderate social democrat and, although of Indian 
descent, he sought to maintain a balance between the various ethnic and religious groups 
that make up Mauritius.   He also balanced Mauritius’ international relationships, although 
generally taking a pro-Western line.  This included a mild, if largely symbolic, opposition to 
the US presence at Diego Garcia. 
 
Even before the independence of Mauritius, India saw itself as having a special relationship 
with the island.   Early Mauritian political leaders of all persuasions took inspiration from 
India’s struggle for independence and the Indian community clung tenaciously to the idea of 
Mother India.   After the departure of the Royal Navy from the region, India effectively 
assumed responsibility for Mauritius’ security under a 1974 defence agreement.  In effect, 
this agreement signified Mauritius swapping one security guarantor for another.  Under the 
agreement India transferred patrol boats and a helicopter to Mauritius and the Indian Navy 
effectively took responsibility for the Mauritian Coast Guard.   Indira Gandhi considered 
Mauritius to be one of India’s most dependable international partners and a potential safe 
haven for her and her family.4   
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New Delhi had supported Seewoosagur Ramgoolam since independence.  But by the early 
1980s he was barely hanging on to power and it was clear that he would lose the 
forthcoming election to the main opposition party, the Mouvement Militant Mauricien 
(MMM).   Ramgoolam was deeply unpopular as compared with the MMM, which had a 
young leadership and often identified with radical third world movements.  The MMM was 
nominally led by Anerood Jugnauth, a London-trained lawyer of Indian descent, but its 
“ideological leader”, was a firebrand socialist of French descent, Paul Berenger.    With 
political change likely, the politically active Indian Mission in Port Louis facilitated several 
meetings in New Delhi between Indira Gandhi, Jugnauth and Berenger in 1980 and 1981.  
Mrs Gandhi faced the reality of the forthcoming transfer of power and swung her support 
behind the MMM.  Gandhi also hoped to see the new government take a stronger stand 
against the US presence at Diego Garcia.5   
 
But many still had misgivings about the MMM’s radical policies, and Berenger’s leftist views 
in particular.  Berenger called for close ties with Libya and the Soviet Union and socialist 
leaning African states.  Much attention was also focused on the MMM’s links with Libya 
whose leader, Muammar Gaddafi, was widely seen as representing both Arab radicalism 
and as a fellow traveler of the Soviet Union.  Among other things Libya was financing the 
conversion of Mauritian Hindus to Islam.6   
 
In June 1982, Ramgoolam decisively lost a general election to the MMM, after which   
Jugnauth became Prime Minister, with Berenger as Finance Minister.  Days later, Indira 
Gandhi made a triumphant visit to the island, showcasing India’s special relationship with 
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Mauritius and its approval of the new government.  Among other things, Mrs Gandhi 
approved a double tax treaty that has since allowed Mauritius to position itself as an 
offshore financial centre and the primary route for foreign investment into India.7 
However ideological and personality differences among Mauritius’ new leaders surfaced 
within months.  There was considerable personal friction between Jugnauth and Berenger, 
and major disagreements over Berenger’s imposition of economic austerity measures 
mandated by the IMF.  There was also disquiet over Berenger’s attempts to promote French 
Creole as Mauritius’ national language.   For Berenger and other young socialists, 
creolisation was an important social engineering exercise to transcend what they saw as 
non-indigenous languages and cultures and create a single homogeneous Mauritian 
culture.8   
 
The Creole language issue became a proxy for the communal tensions that surfaced under 
the new government.  Some non-Hindu leaders feared that the delicate communal balance 
in Mauritius that Ramgoolam had nurtured since independence would be upset by Jugnauth 
and that Mauritius would come to be dominated by a majority Hindu culture.  Hindu leaders 
were frustrated that they had less economic and political power than the Franco-Mauritians 
despite their majority numbers and feared that Berenger’s role in the new government 
could signal a return of the “Grand Blancs” to power.  Some believed that Berenger 
intended to exclude high caste Hindus from power and even establish military rule.  As one 
analyst commented on Berenger’s policy of creolisation:  “The stake was high: no less than 
the reversal of the whole ethnic political balance which had structured the regime of 
independence.”9 
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 By early 1983 Jugnauth had become increasingly concerned about the possibility of 
Berenger leading a coup against him with the help of Libya and the Soviet Union.   The 
Indian Mission in Port Louis kept a close watch on developments. According to one of 
Jugnauth’s advisors, after the 1982 election both the United States and the Indians were 
feeding false intelligence to Jugnauth about Berenger’s socialist links.10  In February 1983, 
Jugnauth met with Mrs Gandhi in New Delhi, where he requested military assistance in the 
event of a coup by Berenger.  According to an advisor to Jugnauth who was accompanying 
him, Mrs Gandhi assured him of Indian support, telling him that, “Within five hours a 
contingent of my air force will be in Mauritius.”11    
 
The power struggle came to a head in mid March 1983.  On Mauritian Independence Day, 
while Jugnauth was in New Delhi attending a Non Aligned Movement summit, Berenger 
arranged for the Mauritian National Anthem to be broadcast over Mauritian television in 
Creole, referring to Creole as the new national language.12  On Jugnauth’s return to 
Mauritius, Berenger proposed constitutional changes that would strip power from the prime 
minister.  The MMM government disintegrated and Jugnauth was left with a small number 
of mostly Hindu followers. 
 
The collapse of the government heightened communal and ideological tensions throughout 
Mauritius.  Jugnauth feared for his safety after he was jostled by Berenger supporters.   
Local media reported the formation of a “workers’ militia” led by Berenger.  Jugnauth spoke 
of the dangers of “growing fascism,” labelling Berenger a “racist”and comparing him to 
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Stalin.13   Hindu leaders exploited Hindu communal fears about Berenger, while Berenger 
supporters saw Hindu leaders such as Harish Boodhoo as being in league with New Delhi.14   
 
New Delhi’s concerns  
 
New Delhi was extremely concerned about these developments.  It was worried about the 
welfare of the Indian ethnic population in Mauritius under a Berenger government that may 
favour the Creole and Muslim minorities and potentially provoke a refugee exodus by 
Hindus.15 Over the previous decades, there had been considerable official discrimination 
against the Indian minority communities throughout the Indian Ocean region – at the hands 
of whites in South Africa, black Africans in East Africa and the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka.  In 
1972, the entire Indian community had been expelled from Uganda by Idi Amin.  In mid 
1983, rising communal tensions between Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri Lanka would explode 
into pogroms and civil war.  Official discrimination against Indians also existed elsewhere in 
the world, even where Indian community represented a majority or near majority of the 
population. In Guyana, the majority Indian ethnic community had been excluded from 
power since independence.  In Fiji, constitutional restrictions had been introduced to 
prevent the majority Indian ethnic community from exercising political control.     While 
India had previously left its diasporic communities to their own fates, by the early 1980s the 
protection of Indian ethnic communities outside of India had become a factor in New Delhi’s 
calculations.16 
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Of probably greater significance were New Delhi’s concerns about the drift of Mauritius out 
of India’s sphere of influence and the possible loss of Mauritius as the only unquestioning 
supporter of India’s foreign policy in the Indian Ocean.  In particular, New Delhi was 
concerned about Mauritius’ links with Libya and the Soviet Union, which had been funding 
the MMM prior to the 1982 election.17  After the election, Mikhail Orlov, the Soviet 
Ambassador to the Seychelles, had met secretly with Berenger to offer Soviet assistance in 
reorganising Mauritian internal security services and they later offered to supply patrol 
boats to the Mauritius Coast Guard. 18  Jugnauth ruffled feathers in New Delhi by making his 
first official overseas visit to Libya rather than India.  Jugnauth also visited Moscow where 
he was told that Soviet assistance would be conditioned economic assistance on Mauritius 
moving towards a socialist system.19   
 
There were even greater concerns about a government led by Berenger.  His French 
ancestry and his attempts to undermine the power of Hindu communal groups would not 
have helped create the view that he would be a reliable supporter of India. Although New 
Delhi saw many benefits from its relationship with the Soviet Union, including its role as a 
supplier of defence equipment and its strategic role in balancing against China, India 
remained jealous of its relationships in the region and would have seen a drift of Mauritius 
into the Soviet orbit, particularly under white leadership, in negative terms.  Mrs Gandhi 
may well have seen the crisis as an opportunity to consolidate India’s political role in 
Mauritius.   This was part of a broader strategy then being followed by New Delhi in 
asserting and expanding its influence throughout the Indian Ocean region, from Sri Lanka, to 
Maldives, the Seychelles, Southern Africa and even the Antarctic.20   
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 The United States also supported the status-quoist Jugnauth against the socialist Berenger.  
The US was particularly worried that a Berenger government might allow the Soviet Navy 
access to Port Louis and would also aggressively prosecute Mauritius’ claims over Diego 
Garcia.  General Vernon Walters, the legendary Deputy Director of the CIA, took a close 
interest in Mauritius, cultivating personal links with Harish Boodhoo and other Hindu 
leaders.21  While the US was working to undermine Berenger during this period, it is not 
clear whether the US and India actively coordinated their activities in Mauritius.    However, 
Mauritius’ later move towards a broadly pro-Western foreign policy under a new Jugnauth-
led government (which will be discussed below) certainly suggests that there may have 
been considerable US involvement in the crisis. 
 
Plans for Indian military intervention: Operation Lal Dora  
 
As the Mauritian political crisis deepened in mid-March 1983, Indira Gandhi ordered the 
Indian Army and Navy to prepare to intervene against a possible coup against the Jugnauth 
government.  Despite Mrs Gandhi’s earlier promise to Jugnauth, Mauritius was well beyond 
the airlift capabilities of the Indian air force.  Instead, the intervention plan, named 
Operation Lal Dora22, involved the landing in Port Louis of two battalions from the 54th 
Infantry Division, the Indian Army’s designated rapid reaction unit based in Hyderabad.   
 
The plan unfolded in a way that was typical of the lack of coordination between the Indian 
Army and Navy at that time.  An advance battalion of 54th Division troops arrived 
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unexpectedly at the Indian Naval dockyard in Mumbai after a 30 hour journey from 
Hyderabad with orders to board Western fleet ships.  Remarkably, the Navy’s Western 
Command in Mumbai, which had commenced planning for the operation, had not been 
informed of the Army movement and many crew were on shore leave.   The troops initially 
attempted to virtually force their way onto INS Mysore, which was the largest warship 
berthed alongside, but were stopped by the Operations team of the Western Naval 
Command and staff of the Western Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral K K Mukherjee.23  After 
negotiations between the Army and Navy, the troops were sent to camp at the sprawling 
Colaba Army base to await orders while some of the Army’s equipment was loaded on the 
INS Mysore, and fuel, victuals and medical supplies were ordered for the amphibious task 
force.  
 
Indian Naval officers then set to planning the naval operation.  Having studied the recent UK 
operation in the Falklands less than a year previously, they believed that the Navy could 
transport the troops from its main western naval base in Mumbai to Mauritius with two 
days preparation, followed by around five days sailing time.  The Navy then had no 
specialised amphibious lift capability in the Western Fleet, but the troops were to be 
transported on warships.  The naval task force was to include: 
• one or two modern Rajput class guided missile destroyers (INS Rajput and/or INS 
Rana), carrying KA-28 Helix helicopters;   
• three or four Leander class destroyers carrying Alouette helicopters, as well as MK-
42C Sea Kings for slithering operations;  
• a Deepak class naval tanker, carrying one helicopter;  
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• a civilian tanker requisitioned from the Indian state-owned shipping company (which 
had previously taken part in naval exercises with a naval party on board) for 
replenishment at sea; and 
• a survey and training ship.24   
 
Notably, the naval task force would have no fixed-wing air support.  India’s sole aircraft 
carrier at that time, INS Vikrant, was then in the process of being refitted for new Sea 
Harrier aircraft and was not available.  Despite the crucial role that fixed wing aircraft had 
played in the Falklands campaign, the lack of air support was apparently of little concern to 
the Indian Navy given that Mauritius had no air force.    
 
Disagreements in the War Room 
 
While preparations were being made in Mumbai, senior military and intelligence officers 
met with Mrs Gandhi in the War Room in South Block to discuss the operation.  Present at 
the meeting was Mrs Gandhi’s National Security Advisor, R N Kao, a former head of RAW.  
The Navy was represented by Admiral O S Dawson, Chief of Naval Staff.  The Army was 
represented by Lieutenant General S K Sinha, who was then Vice Chief of Army. (The Chief 
of Army, General Krishna Rao, was then on tour in Vietnam and Sinha was preparing to take 
over from Rao several months later).  Dawson was known to be close to Mrs Gandhi and her 
family since his younger days when he was ADC to the Indian President and would receive 
Mrs Gandhi’s children at the President’s pool.   But Sinha had a more difficult relationship 
with her.25   
12 
 
 It became apparent that the Indian Army and Navy had quite different views about the 
operation.  There were considerable disagreements between Army and Navy over command 
and control of the amphibious task force.  The naval task force was to be commanded by 
Vice Admiral Nayyar.   Admiral Dawson argued that the Navy should be in overall command 
of operation, while General Sinha argued for overall command.   Mrs Gandhi suggested that 
Navy would be force commander at sea but the Army would assume command of the task 
force once the landings took place (an arrangement which Navy was not at all happy with).26 
 
Other than the question of command, the Navy was confident of its ability to execute the 
operation, even at a distance of some 4,600 km from its fleet base in Mumbai.   The Indian 
Navy believed that it had the capability to conduct operations at long distance, and had 
become confident in its capabilities to refuel and replenish at sea.  The Navy was also 
familiar with Port Louis, having accumulated intelligence reports and photographs etc from 
numerous ship visits over the years and from the Indian naval officers stationed there.  The 
Navy was not overly concerned about landing the troops.  It was believed that troops could 
be properly briefed at sea for alongside landings and disembarkation.  The Navy did not 
believe that troops would need to be landed on beaches, but expected that troops could be 
landed at Port Louis docks without opposition, or at worst a semi-opposed landing at the 
docks.   The Mauritian Coast Guard (commanded by an Indian naval officer) could also 
provide assistance if necessary. Nayyar however requested Rules of Engagement in the 
event of US intervention, no doubt remembering the Navy’s experience in 1971 when it had 
been given no Rules of Engagement in relation to the USS Enterprise.   
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 However, General Sinha told Mrs Gandhi that he did not have confidence in the planned 
operation.27   Apart from the question of command, Sinha had major concerns about the 
army’s ability to conduct an amphibious operation of this nature and about the possibility of 
US intervention.  Sinha believed that his troops were inadequately trained for amphibious 
operations.  The Army’s previous experience at an opposed amphibious landing had been 
disastrous.  In the closing days of the 1971 Bangladesh War, in Operation Beaver, a force of 
Gurkhas had been landed near Cox’s Bazaar in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in an attempt 
to cut off an escape route of retreating Pakistani troops into Burma.  The amphibious force 
had not been able to find the correct landing beach and several Gurkhas drowned when 
they were ordered to disembark with full equipment into deep water.  The badly planned 
operation was widely regarded as a fiasco.  Sinha, a Gurkha himself, was no doubt deeply 
aware of this.  Sinha was also very concerned about the possibility of US intervention in the 
operation. The USS Enterprise was still fresh in the minds of Indian military leadership, as 
was the presence of US forces at Diego Garcia.   Some have called a preoccupation among 
some Indian military strategists with US intervention the “Enterprise Syndrome.”  
 
There is reason to believe that Sinha may have been sufficiently concerned about the 
possibility of US intervention to take the initiative of personally consulting with US 
representatives about Washington’s views on the Mauritian political crisis.  (In this regard, it 
is worth noting that the Indian armed forces are notoriously kept compartmentalized from 
both intelligence analysis and political decision-making in New Delhi.)  According to 
B.Raman, a former head of the counter-terrorism division of RAW, the Indian intelligence 
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services later became aware that a “senior” Army officer leaked Jugnauth’s request for 
assistance and the details of the War Room meeting to the US Embassy in Delhi, which later 
“affected his chances of rising to the top.”28   Two months later, against longstanding 
tradition, Mrs Gandhi controversially ordered that Sinha be passed over in his expected 
promotion to Army Chief and he took early retirement from the Army. (Sinha then joined 
the opposition BJP party and subsequently served as Ambassador to Nepal and Governor of 
Kashmir.)   If Raman is to be believed, Sinha was passed over because of leaks over the 
Mauritius operation, and not because of his opposition to an assault on Sikh militants in the 
Golden Temple in Amritsar, which was widely thought to be the reason.29  
 
With the military commanders unable to agree on execution of the operation, Mrs Gandhi 
decided against the operation and Operation Lal Dora was put on hold.  Equipment was 
unloaded and troops were returned to barracks.  The most obvious reason was the Army’s 
distinct lack of enthusiasm for the operation.  However, Mrs Gandhi was shrewd. It is also 
possible that she merely intended Indian preparations for the operation to act as a signal to 
relevant Mauritian leaders of India’s determination to support Jugnauth.30 Word was spread 
in Port Louis that the Indian Navy was “surrounding” Mauritius.31   
 
Political intervention and the 1983 elections 
 
According to one account, in place of Operation Lal Dora, upon the suggestion of R N Kao, 
Mrs Gandhi decided to send N F Suntook, then head of RAW, to Port Louis to deal with the 
crisis at a political level.32   Suntook was due to retire at the end of March 1983 and he was 
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requested to delay his retirement by a couple of weeks.  Suntook’s mission to Mauritius was 
never publicly disclosed.  Indeed, his abrupt disappearance a few days prior to his scheduled 
retirement provoked somewhat bizarre accusations in the Indian media that he had 
defected to Washington.33   
 
In Mauritius, Suntook was assisted by Prem Singh, the Indian High Commissioner, who was 
well known for his highly partisan support for Jugnauth.34 Singh was later accused of having 
played a virtual pro-consul role in Mauritian politics.35  Suntook and Singh worked with 
Harish Boodhoo and other Hindu and Muslim leaders to persuade them to swing their 
support behind Jugnauth, and it is likely that financial incentives were offered.36  Berenger 
claims that he knew nothing of Suntook’s role.37  The efforts of Jugnauth and his Indian 
backers to build a new Hindu coalition around Jugnauth were successful. On the day after 
Suntook returned to Delhi in April, Jugnauth announced the establishment of a new party 
called the Militant Socialist Movement (MSM), which merged Boodhoo’s Parti Socialiste 
Mauricien with Hindu elements from the MMM.   This new party, along with other 
opposition groups, had the numbers to form a new government in Parliament.    
 
New elections were called for August 1983, which Jugnauth would win convincingly.  The 
election campaign was divided on highly communalist basis and included threats of 
violence.  Boodhoo claimed that a Libyan hit squad was in Mauritius to conduct 
assassinations.38 There was a purported assassination attempt on Boodhoo on the eve of 
the election, although some insiders have claimed that the incident had been organised by 
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Boodhoo himself.39  It is highly likely that the MSM received significant financial support 
from India during the campaign.40   
 
The Aftermath 
 
The events of 1983 consolidated India’s already extensive influence in Mauritius.  Since that 
time all major political leaders have publicly acknowledged India’s special role in Mauritius’ 
security.  After the 1983 election, Jugnauth requested the appointment of Major General J N 
Taimini, the Indian Army’s chief liaison officer with RAW, as the Mauritian National Security 
Advisor.  Tamini occupied that post for more than a decade, to be followed since that time 
by other Indian appointees with connections to RAW.      
 
Mauritius also took a distinctly pro-Western turn in foreign policy.  The new Deputy Prime 
Minister Gaetan Duval, who represented the old guard of pro-Western leaders, took charge 
of foreign policy, stating that Mauritius considered itself “a staunch ally of the West.”41 
Jugnauth refused to receive the Soviet Ambassador, Nicolai Pankov, who was thereupon 
recalled to Moscow. The Libyan diplomatic mission was expelled after refusing to cease its 
non-diplomatic activities in providing financial assistance to the Muslim community.  
Jugnauth backpedalled on Berenger’s previous strident stance on Diego Garcia, reportedly 
stating that “we have to accept the base is there.”42  Mauritius continued its formal claim to 
sovereignty over Diego Garcia, but dropped demands for closure of the base and any appeal 
to the International Court of Justice.  Jugnauth also lifted the embargo on the supply of 
labour to the US base that had been imposed by his previous government.  Relations with 
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South Africa also improved.  Duval was known to be particularly close to South Africa and 
was a frequent visitor there.  Jugnauth stated that Mauritius would be “realistic” in its 
relations with Pretoria even though it was opposed to apartheid.43    Pretoria was allowed to 
open a diplomatic presence in the form of a trade office. 
 
The Mauritian crisis also presaged India playing a much more active role throughout the 
Indian Ocean, particularly after Rajiv Gandhi assumed office in 1984.  As Admiral RH 
Tahiliani (who in 1984 took over from Admiral Dawson as Chief of Naval Staff) commented:  
“We must take the responsibility that size imposes on us, without having any hegemonistic 
aspirations.  Coming to the help of a small neighbour is a responsibility, but we have no 
intention of spreading our sphere of influence.”44  In 1986, the Indian Navy secretly 
intervened used one of its frigates, the INS Vindhyagiri,  in the Seychelles to head off one of 
several attempted coups (Operation Flowers Are Blooming).45  In July 1987, Rajiv Gandhi 
sent peacekeeping forces in the Sri Lanka in an attempt to enforce a negotiated solution to 
civil war (Operation Pawan).   In November 1988, following a request by the Maldivian 
President, India flew a battalion of paratroops to the Maldives, making a daring landing at 
Malé airport to avert an attempted coup by Tamil mercenaries (Operation Cactus).  India’s 
unprecedented level of activity in the Indian Ocean only ended after the humiliating 
withdrawal of Indian troops from Sri Lanka in 1990.  Rajiv Gandhi was subsequently 
assassinated by Tamil extremists in May 1991 in retribution for his role in the operation.   
India found that foreign interventions can sometimes carry a significant cost.    
 
Lessons from Operation Lal Dora 
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 In some ways the story of Operation Lal Dora is merely an interesting footnote to the Cold 
War – when jostling between the West and the Soviet bloc in the Indian Ocean threatened 
India’s role in the region.   However, the story also has broader significance in a number of 
respects and particularly in light of Washington’s hopes that India will take a broader 
security role in the Indian Ocean.   
 
First, the events of 1983 were a turning point in the close security relationship between 
India and Mauritius, which continues and has in fact strengthened since then.  India has 
effectively become Mauritius’ security guarantor and Mauritius has “willingly subordinated” 
itself to India in strategic matters.  Mauritius now provides an anchor for India’s growing 
sphere of influence in the southwest Indian Ocean.46 
 
Second, Operation Lal Dora demonstrated the willingness of India during the 1980s to 
conduct foreign military interventions.  In some respects, India was much more of a 
“normal” state – in terms of its willingness to project military power - than the nonaligned 
rhetoric of the times would suggest.       
 
Third, these events demonstrate how Indian and US interests were often aligned, even in 
the depths of the Cold War - again, despite New Delhi’s rhetoric.   India’s interests in 
maintaining its influence in Mauritius transcended its relationship with the Soviet Union.  
There seems to have been an interesting, if limited, commonality of interests between India 
and the United States over Mauritius.   New Delhi appears to have considered that its 
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primary long-term interest in Mauritius lay in supporting the Jugnauth government with the 
intention of maintaining the dominant position of the Hindu community in Mauritian 
politics.   US interests appear to have been served by supporting a relatively conservative 
Jugnauth government which could be persuaded to reject Soviet and Libyan influence and 
adopt a more Western-oriented foreign policy.    It is unclear whether or not this was the 
outcome of a specific understanding between New Delhi and Washington.   An implicit 
alignment of Indian and US strategic interests in the Indian Ocean would be seen in several 
other instances during the 1980s, predating the public development of strategic links during 
the 1990s. 
 
Fourth, the story of Operation Lal Dora illustrates the lack of jointedness, failures in 
operational coordination and lack of communication between services that have long 
plagued the Indian armed forces.  The operation involved little or no joint planning and 
issues of command remained unresolved.   Some steps have been taken to address these 
problems, including the establishment of the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) in 
2002, although there are questions about its effectiveness.   Despite calls for many years, 
there is still no Chief of Defence Staff as a single point advisor to the government.  
Coordination between India’s armed forces is still seen by many to be woefully inadequate 
compared with other major powers.   A lack of coordination in joint operations could have a 
significant impact on India’s credibility as a major power.  This is likely to be a major issue 
for India in coming years as demands for it to conduct combined force operations grows. 
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Finally, the story sheds light on India’s military capabilities.  Although the Navy was 
confident in its abilities to successfully conduct the operation, it had to make do without 
proper amphibious capabilities.  Troops were to be transported aboard warships and the 
fleet logistics train was extremely thin.  No fixed wing air cover was available.  In contrast, 
the Army had little confidence in its abilities to conduct the operation.  There have been 
considerable attempts to address these weaknesses.  Over the last decade or so the Navy 
has further developed its amphibious capabilities through the acquisition of the amphibious 
dock ship, INS Jalashwa and other landing craft.   The Indian Navy is in the process of 
procuring up to four large multi-role support vessels and is establishing an amphibious 
warfare school at Kakinada on India’s east coast.  In 2011, it was announced that the 54th 
Infantry Division (which was to play a role in Operation Lal Dora) had been designated as a 
Reorganised Amphibious Formation.  The Navy, which demonstrated its amphibious 
capabilities in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the Maldives as part of the 2004 Tsunami relief 
efforts, is eager to learn from the experience of the United States and others in amphibious 
operations through bilateral exercises.  As India stretches its sea legs in the Indian Ocean 
and beyond into the Pacific, the need for these capabilities is only likely to grow.   
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